

# z/OS VULNERABILITY SCANNING AND MANAGEMENT

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## Ray Overby

- SKK - ACF2 Developer (1981-1988)
- Key Resources, Inc. incorporated in 1988
  - Systems Programming
  - Security Audit and Reviews
  - Security Product Development
- Developed ESM Conversion and Merge products
- Consulting & Development for RACF add-on ISV
- Common Criteria Lab doing vulnerability analysis
- Developed Automated Penetration Testing product
- z/OS Internals & Security expert



## Agenda

- Demonstration of Integrity Based Exploit
- Discuss System Configuration Vulnerabilities
- Discuss External Security Manager (ESM) Vulnerabilities
- Discuss Integrity Vulnerabilities
- Summary



## Demonstration - Exploit Setup

- TSO user logged in to TSO on a z/OS 1.13 system
- TSO user has no extraordinary security authority
- Requires the ability to create and execute a program
- Program does not require APF authorization



## Demonstration Outline

- Demonstrate user does not have access to a dataset
- Execute the exploit program
- Demonstrate user now has access to the dataset (no RACF logging will occur)
- Note: External Security Manager (ESM) IBM-RACF. Exploit works with CA-ACF2 or CA-TSS with minor modifications.



## Demonstration - Create the Exploit

- KRI will not share the Program details
- Type in the Program, Assemble and link edit
  - Need to be able to create a new Dataset
  - Or update an existing one
- Or file transfer source, object or load module to your system
- Or use the TSO TEST command
- Or .....



## Demonstration - Access the Dataset - ISPF 3.4

```

Menu  RefList  RefMode  Utilities  Help
-----
                                Data Set List Utility
Option ==>  _
-----
                                More:  +
blank Display data set list      P Print data set list
  V Display VTOC information      PV Print VTOC information

Enter one or both of the parameters below:
Dsname Level . . . NOACCESS.TESTDSN
Volume serial . . . _____

Data set list options
Initial View
 1 1. Volume
 2 2. Space
 3 3. Attrib
 4 4. Total

Enter "/" to select option
/ Confirm Data Set Delete
/ Confirm Member Delete
/ Include Additional Qualifiers
/ Display Catalog Name
_ Display Total Tracks
_ Prefix Dsname Level

When the data set list is displayed, enter either:
"/" on the data set list command field for the command prompt pop-up,
an ISPF line command, the name of a TSO command, CLIST, or REXX exec, or

```



## Demonstration - Edit the File

```
Menu Options View Utilities Compilers Help
-----
DSLIST - Data Sets Matching NOACCESS.TESTDSN          Row 1 of 1
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> CSR
-----
Command - Enter "/" to select action                Message                Volume
-----
e_          NOACCESS.TESTDSN                        UCBA DF
***** End of Data Set list *****
```





## Demonstration - ISPF 3.4 Dataset List

```
Menu Options View Utilities Compilers Help
-----
DSLIST - Data Sets Matching NOACCESS.TESTDSN                               Row 1 of 1
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> CSR
-----
Command - Enter "/" to select action                                     Message                               Volume
-----
NOACCESS.TESTDSN                                                       UCBA DF
***** End of Data Set list *****
```

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## Demonstration - Getting into Edit

```

MKRI TSO B
File Edit Font Transfer Macro Options Window Help
[Icons] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [A] [B] [C] [?]

-
D
C
C
-
e
*

Workstation Help
-----
EDIT Entry Panel

Object Name:
'NOACCESS.TESTDSN'
* No workstation connection
Initial Macro . . . _____
Profile Name . . . _____ (Blank defaults to Type)
Format Name . . . _____
Panel Name . . . _____ (Leave blank for default)

Options
- Confirm Cancel/Move/Replace
- EDIT Mixed Mode
- EDIT host file on Workstation
- Preserve VB record length
/ Warn on First Data Change
- ASCII data

Press ENTER to continue. Press CANCEL to cancel action.

-----
Row 1 of 1
11 ==> CSR

-----
Volume
-----
UCBADF
*****

Ma 0.5 01/16/12.016 08:14AM 192.168.0.13 a 9,27

```

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


## Demonstration - Edit the File

```
Menu Options View Utilities Compilers Help
-----
DSLIST - Data Sets Matching NOACCESS.TESTDSN                      Row 1 of 1
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> CSR
-----
Command - Enter "/" to select action                               Message                               Volume
-----
e_      NOACCESS.TESTDSN                                          UCBA DF
***** End of Data Set list *****
```



## Demonstration - Access Denied!



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "KRI TSO B" with a menu bar (File, Edit, Font, Transfer, Macro, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. The main display area is black with red text. The text shows a command being executed and the resulting error message. The command is: `NOACCESS.TESTDSN CL(DATASET ) VOL(UCBADF)`. The error message is: `ICH408I USER(NORMAL ) GROUP(SYSGROUP) NAME(#####)  
NOACCESS.TESTDSN CL(DATASET ) VOL(UCBADF)  
INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY  
FROM NOACCESS.** (G)  
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )  
IEC150I 913-38,IFG0194E,NORMAL,VATPROCO,ISP08597,0ADF,UCBADF,NOACCESS.TESTDSN  
***`. The terminal prompt is `Ma`. The status bar at the bottom shows: `0.0 01/16/12.016 08:16AM 192.168.0.13` and `7,6`.

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## Demonstration - User Could not Access Dataset

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled 'KRITSOB' with a menu bar (File, Edit, Font, Transfer, Macro, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. The terminal content is as follows:

```

Menu Options View Utilities Compilers Help
-----
DSLIST - Data Sets Matching NOACCESS.TESTDSN           Authorization failed
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> CSR


Command - Enter "/" to select action           Message           Volume
-----
E          NOACCESS.TESTDSN                       UCBADF
***** End of Data Set list *****

```

At the bottom of the terminal window, a status bar displays: Ma 0.0 01/16/12.016 08:18AM 192.168.0.13 a 8,2



## Demonstration - ISPF-6 - Run the Exploit



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "KRI TSO B" with a menu bar (File, Edit, Font, Transfer, Macro, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. The main display area contains the following text:

```
Menu List Mode Functions Utilities Help
ISPF Command Shell
Enter TSO or Workstation commands below:
==> call 'exploit1.load(expl0099)'
```

Below the command, a green prompt reads: "Place cursor on choice and press enter to Retrieve command". This is followed by a vertical list of ten green arrows pointing to the right, representing a list of options.


The bottom status bar displays: "Ma 0.0 01/16/12.016 08:20AM 192.168.0.13 a 7,37".

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## Demonstration - Exploit Successful!



The image shows a terminal window titled "KRI T50 B" with a menu bar (File, Edit, Font, Transfer, Macro, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. The terminal output is as follows:

```
EXPL0099 - EXPLOIT WORKED
*** _
```

The status bar at the bottom of the terminal displays: "Ma", "0.0 01/16/12.016 08:23AM 192.168.0.13", and "a 2,6".

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## Demonstration - Lets Try Again

```

KRI TSO B
File Edit Font Transfer Macro Options Window Help
[Icons] [A] [B] [C] [?]

Menu Options View Utilities Compilers Help
-----
DSLIST - Data Sets Matching NOACCESS.TESTDSN Row 1 of 1
Command ==> _____ Scroll ==> CSR

Command - Enter "/" to select action Message Volume
-----
e_ NOACCESS.TESTDSN UCBADF
***** End of Data Set list *****

Ma 0.0 01/16/12.016 08:24AM 192.168.0.13 a 8,3

```

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## Demonstration - Getting into Edit

```

-      Workstation  Help
D      _____
C      EDIT Entry Panel

C      Object Name:
-      'NOACCESS.TESTDSN'
e      * No workstation connection
*      Initial Macro . . . _____
      Profile Name . . . _____ (Blank defaults to Type)
      Format Name . . . _____
      Panel Name . . . _____ (Leave blank for default)

      Options
      - Confirm Cancel/Move/Replace
      - EDIT Mixed Mode
      - EDIT host file on Workstation
      - Preserve VB record length
      / Warn on First Data Change
      - ASCII data

      Press ENTER to continue. Press CANCEL to cancel action.
  
```

```

_____
Row 1 of 1
11 ==> CSR

      Volume
-----
      UCBA DF
*****
  
```



## Demonstration - User Now Has Access

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "KRI TSO B" with a menu bar (File, Edit, Font, Transfer, Macro, Options, Window, Help) and a toolbar. The main display area shows the following text:

```

File Edit Edit_Settings Menu Utilities Compilers Test Help
EDIT          NOACCESS.TESTDSN                      Columns 00001 00072
Command ==> _                                       Scroll ==> PAGE
***** ***** Top of Data *****
==MSG> -Warning- The UNDO command is not available until you change
==MSG>                your edit profile using the command RECOVERY ON.
000001 No one should have access to this dataset.
***** ***** Bottom of Data *****

```

At the bottom of the terminal window, a status bar displays: "Ma 0.1 01/16/12.016 08:27AM 192.168.0.13 a 4,15".

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## Demonstration - Let's Review What Just Happened

- A demonstration of an exploit:
  - INTEGRITY based ALTER level vulnerability
- This exploit will allow any TSO user to:
  - Compromise ALL data on your system
  - Compromise the System
- This vulnerability can be exploited by batch users
- This vulnerability has a CVSS score of 8.4
- This is a compliance violation in every documented compliance guideline!



## System Configuration Vulnerabilities

- IPL (or boot) parameters
- Subsystem startup (JES2|VTAM|TCPIP|CICS|....) parameters
- When specified incorrectly or dynamically modified may introduce vulnerabilities



## Managing System Configuration Vulnerabilities

- Establish the parameters required for each system
  - Document the settings
  - Continuously monitor settings
- Document exceptions
- Remediate any discrepancies



## Managing System Configuration Vulnerabilities

- Assign a CVSS score (or equivalent)
- Keep a history of problems
- Keep a history of changes (who|what|when|where|why)



## External Security Manager (ESM)

- Controls the Security Implementation on your System(s)
- Critical to your Operations
- When specified incorrectly or dynamically modified may introduce vulnerabilities



## Managing ESM Based Vulnerabilities (1)

- Establish which Parameters are Required for each system
- Document the settings
- Continuously monitor settings
- Document Exceptions





## Managing ESM Based Vulnerabilities (2)

- Remediate any Discrepancies
- Calculate a CVSS score (or equivalent)
- Keep a history of problems
- Keep a history of changes (who|what|when|where|why)



## Integrity Based Vulnerabilities

- z/OS has a Statement of Integrity
  - If an unauthorized user bypasses installation controls when not specifically allowed by the installation IBM will take steps to address the problem
- Unauthorized users should not be able to bypass the controls you (and z/OS) have in place
- In order for this to be true z/OS and all modifications made to z/OS (exits, ISV products, installation written code....) have to adhere to the IBM statement of integrity
- Integrity vulnerabilities exist on your system(s)



## Managing Integrity Based Vulnerabilities (1)

- Ensure vendors that provide software for z/OS have an equivalent to the IBM statement of integrity
- Perform integrity based pen testing each time maintenance is applied OR when new versions are installed
- This penetration testing should be a normal part of your QA effort
- Calculate a CVSS score (or equivalent)



## Managing Integrity Based Vulnerabilities (2)

- Patch management is required
- The installation cannot change configuration parameters to remediate the problem
- Only patches will remediate the vulnerabilities
- Need to monitor your systems to verify patches are applied
- More work required when migrating to new release
  - Are all old patches applied to source base of next release OR are new patches required



## Integrity Assessment (1)

- Focus on authorized code paths
  - SVCs
  - PC routines
  - Exits
  - APF authorized programs
- There can be 10,000 + programs to review



## Integrity Assessment (2)

### For each vulnerability identified:

- Verify exploitability
- Collect information about the vulnerability
  - What program
  - How to invoke it
  - What parameters to pass
- Don't create an exploit
  - Puts your installation at risk
  - Puts code owner at risk
  - Puts other installations at risk



## Integrity Assessment (3)

### For each vulnerability identified:

- Why you might have to create an exploit
  - Prove to installation
  - Code owner won't work on problem without it
- Identify the Code Owner
- Calculate a CVSS score – ALTER level Integrity based vulnerabilities will normally be in the 8.4 range
- Report Problem and CVSS score to the Code Owner
- Code Owner Accepts the Problem



## Integrity Assessment (4)

### For each vulnerability identified:

- Code Owner makes Remediation Available
- Apply Remediation to your System
- You reassess the system to verify that remediation:
  - Fixes the Problem
  - Does not introduce any New Problems
- Do this until no more vulnerabilities
- Restart process next time you do maintenance or upgrade your system





## Patch management for Integrity Vulnerabilities

- Remediation for Integrity Based Vulnerabilities will be a patch
- You need to ensure that patch is applied to all of your systems
- As you upgrade you need to make sure all patches have been applied in source for next release – if not then you will need patches for the next release
- Majority of Vulnerabilities found are Zero Day



## Summary

**z/OS is one of the most secure platforms however :**

- Vulnerability scanning and Penetration testing must be done on your Mainframe
- Most if not all compliance standards call for one or the other
- Most concede the need for external network testing but testing of Internal access is needed as well
- You need to be performing patch management for the integrity patches



## Questions?

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